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Abstract
This paper examines the inherent link between a countrys education system and its compar-
ative advantage in trade. It suggests that di¤erences in education systems across countries are
probably a stable equilibrium result that is compatible with and reinforced by trade patterns. In
equilibrium, two distinct types of countries emerge, one that exports creativity-intensive prod-
ucts and has an education system encouraging diversity (as illustrated by the US), and the other
one that exports high-quality manufactured products and has an education system promoting
homogeneity in student quality (as illustrated by Japan). Our ndings present a novel expla-
nation for the coexistence of low test scores of students and high economic performance in the
US.
JEL Classication: F16, I20, J24.
Key Words: Education System, Trade Pattern, Talent Distribution.
1 Introduction
For several decades, the relatively low performance of American students on international tests in
math and science has raised serious concerns among scholars as well as the public. Many worry
that this will hurt the international competitiveness of the US economy, given the importance
of human capital in economic growth.1 Such worries, however, may not be necessary after all, as
Gary Becker, the founding father of human capital theory, has pointed out: One of the challenging
School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Email:
plchang@smu.edu.sg. Tel.: 65-68280830. Fax: 65-68280833.
ySchool of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Email: -
huang@smu.edu.sg. Tel.: 65-68280859. Fax: 65-68280833. Huang gratefully acknowledges the support of SMU
research grant C244/MSS6E019.
1See, for example, the inuential report, A Nation at Risk, of National Commission on Excellence in Education
(1983), Schaub and Baker (1991), Westbury (1992), Bracey (1996), Hanushek (2002), and Dillon (2007).
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paradoxes during the past several decades is that American teenagers have consistently performed
below average on international tests in math and sciences, and not especially well on reading tests,
yet the American economy is more productive than any other(Becker 2006). In general, two types
of explanations for the puzzle are put forward. The rst explanation claims that the test scores do
not correctly reect the human capital stocks across countries, while the second explanation argues
that other aspects of the US economy, such as its e¤ective institutions, are su¢ cient to compensate
for the mediocre quality of its schools. In this paper, we propose a novel explanation for the above
paradox about the coexistence of low test scores of students and high economic performance in the
US. The gist of our arguments is that this paradox is an equilibrium outcome compatible with and
reinforced by trade.
The nature of technologies may di¤er across industries. In some industries, the value of the nal
output depends on a long chain of production processes, where workers performing di¤erent tasks
are highly complementary. Such a technology is said to exhibit a property of supermodularity, which
applies to sophisticated manufacturing sectors producing, say, automobiles, industrial equipment,
and chemicals; the O-Ring production function is a special example where the nal quality of
a product is only as good as the weakest link (Kremer 1993). The opposite of supermodularity
is submodularity, in which case the value of the nal output depends disproportionately on the
superior performance of a few tasks. This may characterize industries that require much creativity
in problem solving, such as the software industry or the movie industry. Grossman and Maggi
(2000) show that, between two trading countries, the one with a more diverse talent pool tends
to exhibit a comparative advantage in producing goods or services with a submodular technology.
This accounts for the trade pattern between the US and Japan, where the US has more diverse
talents and exports software, while Japan has more homogenous talents and hence exports cars.
Building on their insights, we go a step further to endogenize the diversity of talent distribution in
both countries by the choice of education systems.
In our model, the initial talent distribution among children is identical across the US and Japan.
All children go through the education system to acquire productive skills, and upon graduation
they will choose to work in either the automobile industry or the software industry. Note that,
due to supermodularity, the overall productivity in the auto industry is higher when the skills
of workers in this industry are more homogenous, while the opposite is true for the submodular
software industry. There is, however, a necessary tension in trying to improve the productivity
of both industries with the same education system. If schools are designed to equip all students,
especially those with low abilities, with a homogenous set of skills, they have to impose certain
disciplines such that students have to work hard to pass numerous tests. This education system
is often associated with a uniform curriculum, high-stake tests, and other centralized methods as
is evident in Japan and other East Asian countries. The resulting huge pressures to conform with
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the uniform standards in terms of education outputs tend to stie the development of individual
talents among students, and hence push all students towards the mean. In contrast, if schools
adopt a low pressure approach, encouraging students to learn at their own paces and forgiving
low performance, students have more freedom to pursue their individual interests and realize their
potentials; without the necessary discipline, however, the less talented students may fail to acquire
the basic set of skills. This approach is often carried out in a decentralized education system as
exemplied in the US. In other words, the Japanese style of education system promotes homogeneity
in the distribution of skills, while the US education system leads to more diversity, even though
the initial talent distributions are identical in both countries. The education systems in other
countries, di¤erent in their orientation towards these two approaches, generally fall between these
two extremes (Cummings 1999).
Returning to the paradox mentioned above, the lower test scores of the US students in compar-
ison to their Japanese counterparts seem to be a natural result of the di¤erent education systems in
the two countries, and they do not hurt the economic performance of the US because the diversity
of its talent pool generates a comparative advantage over Japan in exporting products and services
of creativity-intensive industries. By their very nature, the lower test scores and more diversity in
talent distribution are the twin results of the decentralized and low-pressure US education system,
while the higher test scores and more homogenous talent distribution are the twin results of the cen-
tralized and high-pressure Japanese education system. These two contrasting education approaches
generate two distinct talent pools that increase the productivity of di¤erent types of industries, and
hence lead to di¤erences in countriescomparative advantages and their trade patterns.
It is important to note that the US versus the Japanese style of education system and trade
pattern are an equilibrium result: given the current education systems, the trade pattern will
continue, and given the current trade pattern, both countries will stick to their current education
systems since they reinforce their respective comparative advantages. In the model, we show that,
compared with the autarky situation, the di¤erence in education systems is enlarged when both
countries are open to trade, since the free trade price falls in between the two autarky prices and
hence strengthens the incentives to specialize more through further di¤erentiated education systems.
Such di¤erentiation is larger when the education systems in the two countries are determined by a
political process with majority voting, where the dominant industrys interests matter more, than
by a national social planner who aims to maximize the aggregate welfare.
This paper contributes to the trade literature by showing that countries starting with identical
endowment may nonetheless trade with each other if their endogenously chosen institutions such as
the education system di¤er. Specically, it suggests an inherent and stable link between a countrys
education system and its trade pattern. An immediate implication is that, the adjustment in a
countrys education system may lead to corresponding changes in its trade patterns, and vice versa.
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The most closely related work is Grossman and Maggi (2000), already mentioned above, which takes
the talent distribution as exogenously given. Instead of the technological di¤erence between the
supermodular and submodular sectors, the costly monitoring and incomplete contracting associated
with teamwork are proposed by Grossman (2004) as an alternative explanation for the trade pattern
between the US and Japan. The implications of two-dimensional worker heterogeneity on trade
patterns and income inequality are investigated by Ohnsorge and Treer (2007); they nd that
economies with high inequality in skill endowment will export goods that intensively use either
skill, but not both skills, which is used to explain why the US exports both software and movies
while German exports machinery. Bougheas and Riezman (forthcoming) develop a trade model
where the distribution of human capital is the only di¤erence between two countries, and the
country with a more diverse distribution will export the high-tech product if the demand for the
primary good is relatively strong.
In linking education with trade, this paper is also connected with Kim and Kim (2000). In their
model, education enhances general human capital versus industry-specic skills; as a result, when
combined with international trade, it allows workers to move easily to the fastest-growing industry,
and hence facilitates economic growth. Another related paper is Falkinger and Grossmann (2005),
which shows that, in an oligarchy society where landed elites have more political power, public
education investment conducive to industrialization is typically lower in an open economy than in
autarky. This is similar in spirit to our result that an open economy may adopt a more extreme
education approach that favors the politically dominant industry than in the case of autarky.
The paper is organized as follows. The elements of the basic model are described in the next
section. The e¤ects of education systems on trade patterns are analyzed in Section 3. The education
system is then endogenized in Section 4. Discussions on modeling choices and possible extensions
are in Section 5, and concluding remarks are provided in the last section.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 The Education System
Suppose there is a continuum of workers indexed by i 2 [0; 1], whose initial abilities ai0 are not
individually observable, but follow a distribution G() with support [al0; ah0]  [0;+1). All workers
have to go through an education system that may possibly change their initial skills. The education
system is characterized by a parameter  2 [0; 1], which indicates the level of discipline imposed on
each student.
Specically, a worker with an initial ability ai0 will acquire a skill level ai at graduation such
that
ai = (1  )ai0 + am; (1)
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where am =
R ah0
al0
ai0dG(ai0) is the average ability of the population. So an education system with a
high  will push all studentsskills to the middle and hence reduce the skill diversity, while keeping
the mean ability unchanged. Each workers adulthood skill ai is publicly observed, whose support is
[al; ah]  [al0; ah0], where ah al = (1 )(ah0 al0), and its corresponding cdf is G(a am1  )  F (a).
The workers are ranked according to their abilities such that ai  aj for i < j.
The di¤erence between the education systems in Japan and the US is characterized by their
disciplinary levels, denoted by J and U respectively, where J > U . That is, Japans education
system has more discipline than the US style, and as a result the adult talent distribution ai is
more homogenous in Japan than that in the US, though the talent distribution among children
(ai0) is identical in both countries. The value of  is treated initially as exogenously determined,
and will be endogenized later in the paper.
This simple model of education attempts to capture the necessary tension between teaching valu-
able knowledge and skills through rote learning versus emphasizing independent thinking through
issues and self-expression in discussions. The former approach is associated with more discipline,
where students have to go through many exercises and exams that test whether they have met
required standards before they can go to the next level of study. It is very e¤ective in equipping
all students, especially the least talented ones, with certain knowledge and skills, but its heavy
emphasis on rote learning for standard exams discourages students from exploring and acquiring
new knowledge in their own way, and hence may reduce the creativity component of human capital
(Mayer, Tajika, and Stanley 1991). The opposite is true for the second approach, which, in order
to preserve individual creativity, has to be lenient in the standards required for all students, since
students with low performance in some exams today may excel in others or in future exams. Edu-
cation systems may vary across countries in their orientation towards one of these two approaches.
Among industrial countries, Japan and the US are arguably the two outliers at opposite ends in the
degree of emphasis that schools place on memorizing information rather than thinking for oneself.
2.2 The Economy
Technology. There are two industries in the economy. In the automobile industry, a worker with
ability ai has an output
yAi = a
1 
A a

i ;
where  > 0; aA = (
R ea
al
ai dF (ai))
1= is the weighted average ability of all workers in the auto
industry, and ea denotes the highest ability in it. It suggests that an individual worker is more
productive when his peers in the automobile industry are more productive on average. This may
arise when each workers productivity depends on the quality of some common components in the
production process, which is a¤ected by the overall ability of workers in the industry.
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The workers output in the software industry is
ySi = g(aS)ai;
where g0() > 0 and aS is the highest ability in the software industry. That is, the ablest workers
in the software industry exert a positive externality on all workers in this industry. This happens
when, for example, each worker can improve his productivity by learning from innovations of the
best ones in the industry.
Let p = pS=pA denote the relative price of software. The workers incomes in auto and software
industry are, respectively,
IAi = a
1 
A a

i ; (2)
ISi = pg(aS)ai: (3)
Preferences. Individuals have identical preferences, which are represented by the utility func-
tion
u(cAi; cSi) = c

Aic
1 
Si ;
where cAi and cSi denote individual is consumption of cars and software, respectively. The budget
constraint is cAi + pcSi = Ii, where Ii is the individuals income that is equal to either IAi or ISi.
The optimal choices are thus
cAi = Ii; (4)
cSi =
(1  )Ii
p
; (5)
which lead to the indirect utility function (p; Ii) = (1  )1 p (1 )Ii.
3 Talent Allocation and Trade
3.1 Talent Allocation in the Two Industries
Given the relative price of software p and the average skill aA in the auto industry , a worker will
join the auto industry i¤ IAi  ISi, which implies
ai  (pg(aS)=)
 1
1 aA.
That is, a low ability worker prefers to join the auto industry where his productivity is improved
by abler peers, while a high ability worker is better o¤ working in the software industry where his
income is not dragged down by others. The highest ability in the auto industry, ea, thus coincides
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la
( )Si S iI pg a a=
' ' ( )Si S iI p g a a=
1
Ai A iI a a
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'a% a% ha
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ia
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( )Si S iI pg a a=
1
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'la 'ha
Figure 1: The Threshold Worker Ability ea Decreases in p and Increases in 
with the ability of the marginal worker who is indi¤erent in joining either industry. It is uniquely
determined by ea = (pg(aS)=)  11 aA: (6)
There is incomplete specialization when ea < ah and ea > aA, which are true when p 2 (pl; ph),
where pl  ( aah )1 

g(ah)
; ph  g(ah) , and a = (
R ah
al
ai dF (ai))
1= is the weighted average ability in
population. We assume p 2 (pl; ph) holds throughout the paper.
It is straightforward to see that, when the relative price for software is higher, the income of
the marginal worker between the two industries is higher if he switches to the software industry.
So @ea@p < 0 must hold, which implies @aA@p < 0. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Taking the relative
price of software p as given, an individuals incomes of working in auto and software industries are
respectively IAi and ISi as in (2) and (3), which jointly determine the marginal workers ability ea in
(6). When the relative price of software increases to p0 instead, the workers corresponding income
in the software industry becomes I 0Si = p
0g(aS)ai, where I 0Si > ISi due to p
0 > p, which induces
the initial marginal worker with ability ea to switch to the software industry. This means that the
new marginal worker has a lower ability ea0 where ea0 < ea, and hence the average ability in the auto
industry is also lower than before, where a0A < aA. It thus shifts down the incomes of all workers
in the auto industry since I 0Ai = (a
0
A)
1 ai < IAi.
When the discipline level in education goes up from  to 0, as illustrated in the right part of
Figure 1, the highest ability of workers in the software industry goes down from aS to a0S since in
(1) ai decreases in  when ai > am. Thus, an individuals income in the software industry goes
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down as  increases. The opposite happens to the auto industry, since the lowest ability al increases
to a0l when  increases to 
0, which leads to a higher average ability a0A than before. This means
the marginal worker with ability ea should switch to the auto industry, and hence @ea@ > 0 holds as
well as @aA@ > 0.
The total outputs in auto and software industries are, respectively,
YA = a
1 
A
Z ea
al
ai dF (ai) = aA;
YS = g(ah)
Z ah
ea aidF (ai);
Lemma 1 @YA@ > 0 and
@YS
@ < 0:
Proof. It is straightforward to see that @YA@ > 0 since YA = aA and
@aA
@ > 0. Note that
YS = g(ah)
R ahea aif(ai)dai, where f() is the pdf of F (), ah = (1  )ah0 + am and @ea@ > 0. Thus
@YS
@
=  [g0(ah)
Z ah
ea aif(ai)dai + g(ah)ahf(ah)](ah0   am)  g(ah)eaf(ea)@ea@ < 0:
The lemma shows that an education system with a higher discipline level increases the total
output in the auto industry but decreases the output in the software industry. Since Japan has a
more disciplined education system than the US, an immediate implication is that, when faced with
the same price, the auto industry has higher output in Japan than in the US, while the opposite is
true for the software industry. The PPFs for the US and Japan are illustrated in Figure 2, where
YAJ and YAU denote the auto outputs in Japan and the US respectively, and YSJ and YSU denote
the software outputs in Japan and the US respectively.
3.2 Autarky
In the autarky equilibrium, both auto and software markets are clear so that the ratio of total
supplies for cars and software is equal to the ratio of their total demands. That is,
Y A
pY S
=
P
cAiP
pcSi
=

1   ; (7)
where the second equality is derived from (4) and (5). This leads to
p =
1  

Y A
Y S
: (8)
The RHS of this equation strictly decreases in p, since @RHS@p =
@RHS
@ea @ea@p < 0 holds given @Y A@ea > 0,
@Y S
@ea < 0, and @ea@p < 0, while the LHS is strictly increasing in p, so there is a unique p satisfying
the equality.
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Figure 2: Comparative Advantages of the US and Japan
Lemma 2 @p

@ > 0:
Proof. Condition (8) can be rewritten as V (p; )  (1  )YA   pYS = 0; where
@p
@
=  @V (p; )=@
@V (p; )=@p
=   (1  )
@YA
@   p@YS@
(1  )@YA@p   p@YS@p   YS
> 0
since @YA@ > 0 >
@YS
@ and
@YS
@p =
@YS
@ea @ea@p > 0 > @YA@p .
The lemma shows that the equilibrium autarky price increases in . That is, the higher the
level of discipline in education, the higher the relative autarky price for the software industry in
equilibrium. The intuition is quite obvious; as the auto output increases in  while the software
output decreases in it, the relative supply of software is lower when  is higher, so the relative price
of software is higher in autarky. With identical homothetic preferences, this suggests that Japan
will face a higher relative autarky price of software than the US (pJ > p

U ) given that J > U .
3.3 Free Trade
When there is free trade between the US and Japan, the equilibrium price bp lies in between their
autarky prices pJ and p

U . That is, p

J > bp > pU , so the US will export software and Japan will
export cars. With similar arguments as in the case of autarky price p, we know bp is uniquely
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determined by

1   =
bYAJ + bYAUbp(bYSJ + bYSU ) ; (9)
where bYAJ and bYAU are the outputs of automobiles in Japan and the US, respectively, in free trade,
and bYSJ and bYSU are the outputs of software in the two countries. And bp is higher when either J
or U is higher, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 @bp@J > 0 and @bp@U > 0:
Proof. Condition (9) implies the following identity
V (bp; J ; U ) = (1  )(YAJ + YAU )  (YSJ + YSU )bp = 0;
based on which we get
@bp
@J
=   (1  )
@YAJ
@J
  bp@YSJ@J
 (YSJ + YSU ) + (1  )@(YAJ+YAU )@bp   bp@(YSJ+YSU )@bp > 0;
since @YAJ@J > 0 and
@YSJ
@J
< 0 hold by Lemma 1. Similarly we can prove @bp@U > 0.
In summary, a higher level of discipline in the education system increases the homogeneity of
adult abilities, and hence boosts the productivity of the auto industry compared to the software
industry. Since Japanese education system is characterized by a higher discipline level than the US
education, Japan has a comparative advantage in exporting cars while the US has a comparative
advantage in exporting software. This trade pattern between Japan and the US turns out to be a
stable one, since it reinforces their di¤erences in the education system, as will be shown in the next
section.
4 Endogenous Education Systems
In this section we endogenize the education systems in both Japan and the US. We rst study the
social optimal choices where a social planner maximizes the aggregate welfare in an economy, and
then examine a political economy model of education with majority voting.
4.1 The Social Optimal Education Systems
Recall that the indirect utility function is (p; Ii) = (1 )1 p (1 )Ii. So the aggregate welfare
is
U() =
Z ah
al
(p; Ii)f(ai)dai = 
(1  )1 p (1 )
Z ah
al
Iif(ai)dai
= (1  )1 p (1 )(YA + pYS);
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where the last equality holds since the total income of the population is equal to the total revenue
generated in the economy.
4.1.1 Optimal Education Systems in Autarky
In autarky, the total welfare can be written as U() = (Y A)
(Y S )
1  after plugging in the equilib-
rium price in (8). The FOC to maximize U() becomes, after some algebra,
@U()
@
= (1  )1 (p) (1 )(@Y

A
@
+ p
@Y S
@
) = 0: (10)
It can be shown that a unique solution  exists when @
2Y A
@2
 0 and @2Y S
@2
 0.
4.1.2 Optimal Education in Small Open Economy
Suppose both Japan and the US are small open economies in the world economy. In this case, p
is exogenously determined in the world market, and hence is taken as given by the social planners
in both countries. The following proposition shows that the optimal discipline in the education
system is higher than the autarky level when the world price is below the autarky price, and vice
versa.
Proposition 1 The optimal education system in a small open economy has a higher discipline e
than the autarky level  when the relative price of software p is below the autarky price p, and a
lower discipline level than  when p > p.
Proof. The FOC to maximize the aggregate welfare in either country is
@U(; p)
@
= (1  )1 (p) (1 )(@YA
@
+ p
@YS
@
) = 0; (11)
which coincides with the autarky condition (10) when p = p. Note that
@U(; p)
@p
= (1  )1 p (1 ) 1[ (1  )(YA + pYS) + pYS + p@(YA + pYS)
@ea @ea@p ]
= (1  )1 p (1 ) 1[(YA + pYS)  YA];
where the second equality obtains since @(YA+pYS)@ea = 0 due to MRT = @YA@ea =@YS@ea =  p. So we get
@2U(; p)
@@p
= (1  )1 p (1 ) 1[(@YA
@
+ p
@YS
@
)  @YA
@
]
=  (1  )1 p (1 ) 1@YA
@
< 0;
which implies
@e
@p
=
@2U(; p)
@@p
=( @
2U(; p)
@2
) < 0:
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That is, the optimal discipline e in the education system is higher than the autarky level  when
p < p, and lower than  when p > p.
An immediate implication of this proposition is that, when the relative price of software p goes
up in the world market, we should see the discipline levels in the education systems of both countries
decrease, while the opposite is true when p goes down.
4.1.3 Di¤erence in Education Systems Enlarged in Free Trade
Let J and 

U denote the optimal education systems in Japan and the US when both are in
autarky, and pJ and p

U denote their autarky prices. Consistent with relevant evidence in Section
5, we assume that J > 

U holds due to some exogenous shocks. Since the free trade price lies in
between the autarky prices pJ and p

U , the education systems in Japan and the US may diverge
further from their autarky levels, as implied by Proposition 1. The di¤erence, however, may not
be enough compared with the social optimal outcome chosen by the world social planner.
The world social planners choice. When Japan and the US are two big economies that
constitute the world market and engage each other in free trade, their choices of education systems
will a¤ect equilibrium trade volumes and price. The world social planner should take into account
such international interactions to maximize the total welfare of the two countries when choosing
the optimal education systems for them.
The joint welfare of the two countries is
U(U ; J) = 
(1  )1 bp (1 )[(bYAJ + bpbYSJ) + (bYAU + bpbYSU )]
= (
bYAJ + bYAUbYSJ + bYSU ) (1 )(bYAJ + bYAU ) + (1  )(
bYAJ + bYAUbYSJ + bYSU )(bYSJ + bYSU );
where the second equality obtains after plugging in the free trade price bp as determined by (9). Let
#J and 
#
U denote the social optimal education systems in Japan and the US, respectively, and bp#
denote the equilibrium trade price when #J and 
#
U are adopted. After some algebra, we get the
FOCs to maximize U(U ; J):
@U(J ; U )
@J
= (1  )1 bp# (1 )(@ bYAJ
@J
+ bp#@ bYSJ
@J
) = 0;
@U(J ; U )
@U
= (1  )1 bp# (1 )(@ bYAU
@U
+ bp#@ bYSU
@U
) = 0;
Note that these two FOCs coincide with the FOC (11) for small open economies when the price is
equal to the equilibrium trade price bp#. The intuition is that the indirect impact of J on the trade
price bp# is exactly canceled by that of U so that only their direct e¤ects on domestic outputs
matter. As the equilibrium trade price bp# falls between the two autarky prices pJ and pU , an
implication of Proposition 1 is that #J > 

J > 

U > 
#
U , where 
#
J > 

J is due to p
# < pJ , and
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U > 
#
U is due to p
# > pU . So the world planner would further enlarge the initial di¤erence
between the education systems in Japan and the US to facilitate their comparative advantages.
The social optimal outcome (#J ; 
#
U ; bp#) may be realized when both countries behave as price-
takers as if they were small open economies, choosing their education systems according to condition
(11) until they settle down in the optimal choices #J and 
#
U when the trade price is bp#.
The Nash equilibrium for Japan and the US. In a game where both countries simul-
taneously choose their optimal zc(bp) taking as given the other countrys choice, where c = J; U ,
the resulting Nash equilibrium (zJ ; 
z
U ; bpz) tends to di¤er from the above social optimal outcome
(#J ; 
#
U ; bp#). The reason is that, instead of behaving as price-takers, the two countries take into
consideration the e¤ect of their education choices on the equilibrium trade price, but ignore the
e¤ect on the outputs and welfare of the other country. It turns out that in the equilibrium the two
countries specialize less than the world optimal outcome; specically, we get zJ < 
#
J and 
z
U > 
#
U .
Proposition 2 In a free trade equilibrium where both countries simultaneously choose its education
system taking as given the other countrys choice, the education systems in Japan and the US diverge
more from their autarky levels but less than the world optimal levels.
Proof. The Nash equilibrium (zJ ; 
z
U ; bpz) is determined jointly by the following two FOCs (12)
and (13). The objective function of Japan is
max
J
UJ(J ; U ) = 
(1  )1 bp (1 )(bYAJ + bpbYSJ)
= (
bYAJ + bYAUbYSJ + bYSU ) (1 ) bYAJ + (1  )(
bYAJ + bYAUbYSJ + bYSU ) bYSJ ;
where the second equality obtains by plugging (9). The FOC is
@UJ(J ; U )
@J
= (1  )1 bpz (1 )[@ bYAJ
@J
+ bpz@ bYSJ
@J
 
bYAJ bYSU   bYAU bYSJ
(bYAJ + bYAU )(bYSJ + bYSU )((1  )@
bYAJ
@J
  bpz@ bYSJ
@J
)] = 0: (12)
The last item is positive since bYAJ bYSU   bYAU bYSJ > 0 due to bYAJ > bYAU and bYSU > bYSJ , and
@ bYAJ
@J
> 0 > @
bYSJ
@J
. Recall that @
bYAJ
@J
+ bpz @ bYSJ@J = 0 holds when J is equal to the optimal choiceeJ(bpz) in an small open economy, which implies that @UJ (J ;U )@J < 0 when J = eJ(bpz). This means
zJ < eJ(bpz) whenever an optimal solution zJ exists. In other words, Japans optimal choice of
education discipline zJ in bilateral trade with the US is smaller than its choice eJ as a small open
economy at the same price level. Similarly, when the equilibrium price bpz coincides with the social
optimal price bp#, zJ < #J must hold, since at #J , we have @UJ (J ;U )@J < 0. So Japans optimal
education choice is smaller than its world optimal level #J .
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The objective function of the US is
max
U
UU (U ; J) = 
(1  )1 bp (1 )(bYAU + bpbYSU )
= (
bYAJ + bYAUbYSJ + bYSU ) (1 ) bYAU + (1  )(
bYAJ + bYAUbYSJ + bYSU ) bYSU
The FOC is
@UU (U ; J)
@U
= (1  )1 bpz (1 )[@ bYAU
@U
+ bpz@ bYSU
@U
+
bYAJ bYSU   bYAU bYSJ
(bYAJ + bYAU )(bYSJ + bYSU )((1  )@
bYAU
@U
  bpz@ bYSU
@U
)] = 0: (13)
The last item is negative since bYAU bYSJ   bYAJ bYSU < 0 due to bYAJ > bYAU and bYSU > bYSJ , and
@ bYAU
@U
> 0 > @
bYSU
@U
. Recall that @
bYAU
@U
+ bpz @ bYSU@U = 0 holds when U = eU (bpz), the optimal solution
in the small open economy. This implies that @UU (J ;U )@U > 0 when U =
eU (bpz), which means
zU > eU (bpz) whenever an optimal solution zU exists. Note that when the equilibrium price bpz
coincides with the social optimal price bp#, zU > #U must hold, since at #U , we have @UU (J ;U )@U > 0.
In other words, the USs optimal choice of education discipline zU in bilateral trade with Japan is
larger than its choice eU as a small open economy at the same price level, and it is also larger than
its world optimal level #U .
4.2 A Political Economy Model of Education
The determination process of education system can be explicitly analyzed in an overlapping gener-
ation framework. Suppose there are overlapping generations n = 1; 2; :::, and each generation lives
for two periods labeled as childhood and adulthood. All children go to school, become adult at
graduation and enter the workforce either in the auto or software industry. At the beginning of
each period, the adults jointly choose the education system characterized by n, taking as given
the current price pn in trade and the other countrys education system. The newly chosen n is to
be implemented on children of generation n + 1, who will become adults in the next period when
a new price pn+1 is realized. The steady state equilibrium is denoted by (sJ ; 
s
U ; p
s).
When there is no correlation of talent between parent and child, the social planners choices
analyzed above are obtained in any political economy model with individual voting, where an adult
votes for the optimal n to maximize his childs income, since all adults are faced with the same
optimization problem of maximizing the expected income of a child whose talent is a random draw
from the distribution.
In the following, we consider a political economy model with a positive correlation of talent
across generations and majority voting. Suppose the talent of a child from family i is equal to his
14
parents initial talent ai0 with probability q, and is a random draw from the distribution G() with
probability 1   q, where q 2 [0; 1]. Then in the steady state an individual is optimal choice i
maximizes his childs expected utility
V (i)  qv(i; Ii) + (1  q)U(i);
where v(i; Ii) = (1 )1 p (1 )Ii is the childs indirect utility function when his initial ability
is ai0, and U(i) =
R ah
al
v(i; Ii)f(ai)dai is the average welfare in the economy. Note that when q = 0,
all individualsproblems in an economy are identical with the social planners problem as in (11).
If a voter is working in the auto industry, his childs income is Ii = a1 A a

i with probability q
so that his objective function is
VA(i)  q(1  )1 p (1 )a1 A ai + (1  q)U(i):
His marginal gain from increasing i is
@VA(i)
@i
= q(1  )1 p (1 )a1 A a 1i [(1  )
ai
aA
@aA
@i
+ (am   ai0)]
+(1  q)(1  )1 p (1 )(@
bYA
@
+ p
@ bYS
@
); (14)
where the second term coincides with the social planners FOC as in (11). Recall that am is the
average ability; the rst item is positive for ai0  am, and it may become negative when ai0 is big
enough. Let biA denote the marginal auto worker such that the rst term is just equal to zero, and
his initial ability is abiA0. Then abiA0 > am must hold.
When q = 1, the second item is equal to zero so that @VA(i)@i > 0 holds for all auto workers
with abilities lower than that of individual biA, and the opposite is true for others. This means the
optimal choice of auto workers i < biA will be i = 1, while the other auto workers j > biA will choose
j = 0. As shown below, all software workers with above-median talent will also choose 

j = 0. If
the median-talent voter is working in the auto industry, his ability is am under a symmetric talent
distribution; due to @VA(i)@i > 0 his optimal choice must be 

m = 1, which will be the outcome
of majority voting. The same result will also hold when the mean ability am is higher than the
median ability.
A software workers child income is Ii = pg(ah)ai with probability q so that his objective
function is
VS(i)  q(1  )1 p (1 )pg(ah)ai + (1  q)U(i):
His marginal gain from increasing i is
@VS(i)
@i
= q(1  )1 p[g(ah)(am   ai0) + g0(ah)ai(am   ah0)]
+(1  q)(1  )1 p (1 )(@YA
@
+ p
@YS
@
); (15)
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where the second term also coincides with the social planners FOC as in (11). The rst item is
negative when ai0  am, while it may become positive when ai0 is small enough. Let biS denote
the marginal software worker such that the rst term is just equal to zero, and his initial ability is
abiS0. Then abiS0 < am must hold.
When q = 1, the second item is equal to zero so that @VS(i)@i < 0 for all software workers with
abilities higher than that of individual biS , and the opposite is true for others. This means that the
optimal choice of software workers i > biS will be i = 0, while the other software workers j < biS
will choose j = 1. If the median-talent voter is working in the software industry, his ability is am
under a symmetric talent distribution; due to @VS(i)@i < 0 his optimal choice must be 

m = 0, which
will be the outcome of majority voting; in this case, all auto workers vote for j = 1 since their
abilities are below the median.
In summary, when the talent distribution is perfectly correlated across generations as in the
case of q = 1, two extreme education policies may be adopted: If the median-talent worker is in the
auto industry, the majority voting result is m = 1 so that all adults have homogenous abilities;
however, if the median-talent worker is in the software industry, the majority voting result is m = 0
so that the talent distribution among adults is as diverse as the initial distribution. Thus, a steady
state equilibrium of this political economy model of education when q = 1 is (sJ = 1; 
s
U = 0; p
s),
where ps is determined accordingly by (9).
When q 2 (0; 1), the median voters choice is less extreme than when q = 1 due to the positive
weight on the second term which represents the expected welfare of a random worker. Suppose
@VA(i)
@i
= 0 when i = i ; then 

i > 
 holds for auto workers i < biA, since the second term is
equal to zero at the social optimal level  while the rst term is positive. So the majority voting
outcome is larger than the social planners choice, i.e., m > 
, when the median voter is in the
auto industry. Similar arguments will show that the opposite is true when the median voter is in
the software industry, and the di¤erence between m and 
 is larger when q is bigger. Thus, the
steady state equilibrium of the political economy model of education when q 2 (0; 1) takes the form
(sJ 2 (; 1]; sU 2 [0; ); ps), where ps is determined accordingly by (9).
Overall, the educational systems are more extreme in the political economy model than the
social optimal ones in small open economies, since they tend to reect the dominant industrys
interests more than the aggregate welfare.2
2When individual voters take into account the e¤ect of their choices of i on the equilibrium prices either in
autarky or in bilateral trade, less extreme levels of i will be chosen, since the e¤ect of i on price counteracts its
direct e¤ects on the incomes of workers in both industries. Our qualitative results remain the same as long as the
direct e¤ects on individual incomes are larger than the price e¤ect for the median-talent worker.
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5 Discussions
Immigration and Brain Drain. When immigration is allowed, it is easy to see that the most
talented workers in the software industry may want to emigrate from Japan to the US, where their
productivity is higher due to the positive spillover from the highest ability worker there. Though low
ability workers in the US may want to emigrate to Japan, it may not be allowed by Japan because
such immigration will lower the average quality of its auto workers and thus their productivity.
This one-way immigration further exacerbates the di¤erence in talent diversity between the US
and Japan, which reinforces their trade pattern and distinct education systems. Short of matching
its education system with that of the US, it is di¢ cult for Japan to stop the brain drain.
When the immigration cost is low, it seems natural for the world to develop a stable pattern
where some country, currently the US, serves as the creative hub to attract the brightest people from
all over the world and increasingly specializes in the creative industries, while the rest specialize in
the more traditional industries where the average quality of workers matters more than creativity.
And there is indeed general agreement that the US became a magnate for skilled labor and
scientists, rst from Europe and later from Asia as well, following the economic advances of the US
in the 20th century, especially after World War II(Ehrlich 2007).3
The Stable Di¤erence in Education Systems. Our model shows that the contrasting
styles of education systems in the US and Japan could be a long-term equilibrium outcome that
is compatible with and reinforced by their trade pattern. The decentralized approach was adopted
in the US education, while a centralized education system was adopted in Japan, possibly due
to distinct historical contexts. And this initial di¤erence gets reinforced over time and becomes
di¢ cult to reverse.
The extreme degree of decentralization has long been a distinguishing feature of the US ed-
ucation, and the evolution of this organization structure, dating back from the colonial era, has
been at least partially serendipitous (Black and Sokolo¤ 2006). The decentralized structure in
nancing and administering schools by local or state authorities, through enhanced experimenta-
tion and exibility and focused attention to local environments, has served the US quite well. In
recent decades, however, the low performance of the US students compared with other countries
has raised serious concerns about the quality of education, with calls for overhauling the system
and introducing national standardized testing. But the US students have never performed well on
international tests, especially in math and science, and elementary students are doing much better
than high school students (Hanushek and Kimko 2000, Hanushek 2002). And many scholars point
out that test scores do not capture the extent to which schooling promotes initiative, creativity,
3Several regional hubs may develop when the cost of immigration is high due to, for example, language or cultural
barriers.
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and entrepreneurship, which are emphasized in the US education (Mayer, Tajika, and Stanley 1991,
Bracey 2002, Ramirez et al. 2006).
As a latecomer in modern education, Japan in the Meiji era experimented with local funding
and operation of education only to discover that the people would not pay, so after only a few
years of this experiment, the Meiji state took over the full burden of nancing the public school
system. ... The reliance on state support was associated with a uniform curriculum, a central
system for exams and textbook production, and other centralizing tendencies that deliver more
homogeneous student outcomes than the decentralized US education system (Cummings 1999).
Similar experiences were repeated again during the American occupation of Japan after the World
War II; the decentralization e¤ort initiated by Americans was reversed or modied several years
later to t traditional Japanese models more closely (Beauchamp 1987). In recent years, Japan
has been experimenting with various methods of primary and secondary teaching, in an e¤ort to
prevent cram educationand boost individual potential and ability to think. However, the new
education guidelines have met with heavy criticism from education experts and parents who are
concerned that the educational standards have fallen.
6 Concluding Remarks
Many countries have in recent years put their education systems under close scrutiny in order to
improve their international competitiveness. The US public has shown serious concerns over its
students relatively low performance in the international math and science tests and demanded
dramatic changes in its decentralized and low-pressure education system, even though the US
economy has been doing very well. Somewhat ironically, the consistently high performers such as
Japan have been worried about their students lack of creativity and trying to reduce pressures
from high stake exams.
This paper examines the inherent link between a countrys education system and its comparative
advantage in trade. It suggests that the diverse education systems across countries are a long-term
equilibrium outcome compatible with trade patterns. Specically, the low-pressure education in
the US promotes talent diversity in its workers, which enhances the productivity of industries with
intensive creative components such as the software and movie industries; in contrast, students who
go through the centralized and high-pressure education system in Japan tend to have more homoge-
nous abilities, which increase the productivity of industries with a long and complex production
process such as the automobile and machinery industries. These ndings present a new perspective
in understanding how education may a¤ect a countrys economic performance by enhancing its
comparative advantage in trade, rather than by increasing its absolute advantage over others in
direct competition. Given such a trade pattern between the US and Japan, the initial di¤erence
18
between their education systems will be further strengthened to induce more specialization and
hence to achieve larger gains from trade.
The current model focuses on how the trade pattern between two advanced industrial economies
and their education systems interact. A fruitful topic in future research is to study how the
education system in a country evolves across di¤erent developmental stages in the world economy.
For instance, as a country moves from a low value-added exporter to a high value-added one, its
education system may need to adapt itself accordingly, shifting its main focus from equipping the
majority of the workforce with homogenous basic skills to promoting creativity and diversity in the
talent pool.
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